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The Main Dimensions of Sino-American Relations 1989–2001 
The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China are nowadays 
two the most important countries in the world, taking into account the size of their 
territories, population and Gross Domestic Product. On the other hand, they are 
extremely different if we look at their cultural heritage, political systems or their 
present position on the world political stage. We may predict that their bilateral 
relations may be crucial for the future of our globe in general and for the Asia-Pacific 
Rim in particular. This is why it is beneficial to briefly trace the history and try to 
anticipate the prospects of this curious relationship.  
The twelve-year span we’d like to analyze here is marked off with two landmarks: 
the Tiananmen Square massacre, which took place in 1989 and resulted in a form of 
exclusion of China from the international community, and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001, which were a sort of catalyst for the already improving bilateral 
relations. The other milestone which should be mentioned here is the accession of the 
PRC (The People’s Republic of China) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
November 2001, which was a symbolic completion of the Chinese efforts to overcome 
the imprint of the Tiananmen events and “join the world” (the latter was commenced in 
1978–1979 when Deng Xiaoping announced the program of “four modernizations” and 
opening to the world). 
Historical Overview  
World War II brought about an increase in China’s role for the sake of participation 
in the anti-Japanese coalition. China was perceived as potential U.S. ally in East Asia 
in case of the revitalizing of Japanese militarism. That is why the U.S. president, F.D. 
Roosevelt, convinced the coalition partners to grant China permanent U.N. Security 
Council membership.1 
The situation dramatically changed in 1949, when communist forces, led by Mao 
Zedong, prevailed against the National forces, which withdrew to Taiwan (known then 
as Formosa), setting up the Republic of China. In spite of the fact that President Harry 
S. Truman and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State at that time, characterized China 
as situated outside America’s defensive perimeter in Asia, no action to establish 
diplomatic relations with the PRC was undertaken.2  
Such a possibility ended in June 1950, when the Korean War broke out. In 1951 the 
U.S. decided on giving military help to Taiwan, which was anteceded by the entrance 
of the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait in 1950. In the fifties two more crises related to 
the problem of Quemoy and the Matsu Islands took place. The first resulted in the 
signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the RoC (Republic of 
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China – Taiwan)3, and the second in the Warsaw talks, which became the permanent 
forum for resolving the Taiwan Strait problems caused by both sides.4 
The gradual improvement of the bilateral relations resulted from two main factors: 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the sixties, which reached a peak in 1969 
when the clash on the Ussuri River took place5, and the improvement of the attitude 
towards China in the United States. The first important sign of the improvement of 
bilateral relations was the assurance given to the Chinese government in 1962 that 
Taiwan wouldn’t attack the PRC. Then next important signal was an article written by 
R. Nixon in 1967, in which he said that “China should no longer be treated as a 
pariah”6 and new attitude towards China, perceiving it as a strategic partner in 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.7 
The critical year in bilateral relations was 1971, when a U.S. ping-pong team visited 
China at Mao’s invitation.8 The so-called “ping-pong diplomacy” was followed by the 
secret visit of the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. In almost 20-hour talks 
with Premier Zhou he discussed the preconditions of R. Nixon’s visit to China.9 In 
1971, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that the only legal 
government of China was the government of the People’s Republic of China, which 
resulted in the exclusion of Taiwan from all U.N. bodies.  
President Nixon visited China in February, 1972. The outcome of this visit was the 
Shanghai Communiqué, wherein the U.S. agreed not to question the “one China” 
principle, and both countries decided to work upon the establishment of full diplomatic 
relations as well as improvement of the security environment in East and South-East 
Asia. They both promised not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.10 
Despite such declarations, the world had to wait seven years for the instituting of 
full diplomatic relations. The rapprochement was hampered by internal factors in both 
countries. The U.S. administration was weakened by the Watergate scandal and didn’t 
want to risk a confrontation with the conservative wing, which opposed close relations 
with communist China. On the other hand, the crisis in the PRC after Mao’s death 
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resulted in a lack of a person who could hasten the negotiations till 1978, when power 
was taken over by Deng Xiaoping.11 
The full normalization of bilateral relations took place on January 1st, 1979 and was 
preceded by a joint communiqué published simultaneously in Beijing and Washington 
in December 1978.12 At the same time, diplomatic recognition for the Republic of 
China on Taiwan was withdrawn and the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and 
the U.S.A. was broken off. Instead of full diplomatic relations, the U.S. and the RoC 
maintained the quasi-diplomatic relations.13 In addition to the aforementioned, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which guaranteed the preservation of 
cultural and economic ties, stressing that the future of Taiwan could be determined 
only by peaceful measures and that the U.S. would deliver defensive weapons to the 
island and maintain its ability to defend itself against the mainland’s aggression.14 
The situation was complicated during the 1980 presidential campaign, when the 
Republican candidate, R. Reagan, refused to acknowledge the Shanghai Communiqué 
and denied “Carter’s shameful abandonment of Taiwan,”15 which was followed by an 
increase the deliveries of U.S. weapons to Taiwan. The strategic situation motivated 
the administration to sign the subsequent Shanghai Communiqué, which stated a limit 
that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative 
terms. Apart from a reiteration of matters that had been agreed on beforehand, the 
communiqué was rather a kind of “protocol of disparities” between China and the 
U.S.16  
In spite of these problems, U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the 80s greatly improved. 
There is no doubt that Chinese participation in “the strategic triangle” helped in 
China’s economic modernization and R. Reagan’s presidency proved that pragmatism 
in foreign policy was strong enough to outweigh ideological differences.17 
Tiananmen Massacre and the Bush’s Policy towards Beijing 
George Walker Herbert Bush became the U.S. president in January 1989. The 
administration, as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft has written, has been 
seeking a pretext to go to China before the Soviet leader M. Gorbachev, who was 
                                                        
11 See N. Bernkopf-Tucker, China and America: 1941–1991, “Foreign Affairs,” Winter 1991/1992. 
12 The communiqué reiterated that neither the U.S. nor the PRC would seek a hegemony in the region 
and stressed the role of both in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. See Joint 
Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the 
People’s Republic of China, January 1, 1979, at http://www.usinfo.org/docs/basic/prc_e.htm. About the role 
of U.S.–China rapprochement in the region and the world, see J. Pollack, The Implications of Sino-
American Normalization, “International Security,” vol. 3, no. 4, Spring 1979. 
13 American interests in Taiwan are represented by the American Institute on Taiwan, and Taiwanese 
interest in the U.S. by the Coordination Council for North American Affairs [currently (from 1995) Taiwan 
Economic and Cultural Office in the US]. 
14 See Taiwan Relations Act, at http://www.usinfo.org/docs/basic/tra_e.htm 
15 See N. Bernkopf-Tucker, op.cit. 
16 See U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué, August 17, 1982, at http://www.usinfo.org/docs/basic/817_e.htm 
17 A more detailed analysis of bilateral relations is to be found in R. Garson, The United States and 
China Since 1949: A Troubled Affair, Printer Publishers, London 1994, pp. 22–196; R. Foot, op.cit., 
passim. See also the analysis of the relations 1972–1988 in C. Langlois, J.P. Langlois, Rationality in 
International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of U.S.–China Case, “World Politics,” no. 
48, April 1996. 
supposed to go there in May. There was no reason, however, to justify such a visit till 
the death of the Japanese emperor Hirohito, who died in January. G. Bush decided to 
pay a visit to Beijing after his funeral and landed there on February 25th. It was a 
“signal of the new era’s priorities” for the administration, because newly-appointed 
presidents used to go to Europe first.18 The meeting with Deng Xiaoping was devoted 
largely to Sino-Soviet relations, and assured G. Bush that those relations were still far 
from perfect, hence there was no threat to the U.S. and prospects of further 
development of Sino-American relations seemed excellent.19 
The breakdown of the relationship was an effect of the Tiananmen Square massacre 
that took place on June 4th, 1989. Mass demonstrations of students to commemorate Hu 
Yaobang, a long-standing first secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, perceived as 
the leader of the liberal wing in the party, turned into a long-lasting occupation of the 
main square of Beijing – Tiananmen.20 The authorities decided to suppress it by force. 
The Tiananmen massacre resulted in many international sanctions, which were 
necessary to pacify worldwide public opinion.21 But even in the United States this 
massacre wasn’t condemned by everybody. One of the main realism theoreticians, H. 
Kissinger, said that there was no government in the world that would let tens of 
thousands of demonstrators block the main square of the capital for eight weeks.22 
Despite the above and the administration’s attitude, it was the U.S. that first 
imposed sanctions.23 President Bush and his administration joined the overall criticism 
of China, but began working on saving Sino-American relations at the same time. The 
president was sure that the Tiananmen events wouldn’t lead to an end in economic 
reforms and that these would result in notable political changes in the future.24 In July 
he sent his National Security Adviser B. Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State L. 
Eagleburger on a secret mission to Beijing. Their mission wasn’t accomplished.25 In 
spite of this, Bush insisted on maintaining the communication lines with Beijing, which 
became very important the following year. 
The imposed sanctions and the world’s reaction to the Tiananmen events caused 
significant changes in Chinese foreign policy. One should emphasize three elements. 
The first was the fear of losing political autonomy and internal stability with reference 
to close economic relations with the United States. Second – the strategic situation 
analysis in the region in the context of the declining role of the PRC for the U.S., and 
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third – an increase in Chinese nationalism.26 We could also note the “conspiracy 
theories”, which say that the U.S. Congress and China’s foes in the United States 
united with the people in China to bring down the Chinese Communist Party.27 
On the other hand, the U.S. administration had a lot of problems “at home.” Bush’s 
benevolent China policy was heavily criticized in the U.S. Congress, and the main 
target of criticism was the renewing of the Most Favored Nation clause (later called 
Normal Trade Relations).28 The MFN to China was renewed in May 1990. Shortly 
after China was granted the MFN, the Chinese authorities allowed Fang Lizhi, the most 
famous Chinese dissident, to leave the country and decided to buy Boeing airplanes 
worth $2 billion.29  
Chinese rulers couldn’t do more than this, at least because of two reasons. The first 
was the traditional paradigm of Chinese politics and diplomacy (and of everyday 
Chinese life), dictaing that whatever happens one should “save face.”30 The second 
problem was the weakness of the emerging third generation of Chinese leaders, 
represented by Jiang Zemin.31 
China’s situation radically changed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990. It was mainly China that was to decide whether the UN Security Council would 
accept international intervention in Iraq. Chinese authorities saw the advantages of 
returning to the world stage as a country supporting solutions consistent with 
international law. What was important was that China was very closely bound to the 
idea of multilateralism in international relations, hence the cooperation in the 
framework of the United Nations seemed more beneficial. China didn’t support the use 
of force, but didn’t use the right of veto, either.32 Despite some concessions, political 
relations remained quite tense till the end of Bush’s tenure, in spite of a fast 
improvement in social and economic relations. 
The Evolution of Bill Clinton’s “Chinese Policy” 
Unlike G. Bush, the Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton was neither a 
foreign nor a Chinese policy expert. In his campaign he focused on domestic affairs, 
especially on improving the economy (his election slogan was “It’s the economy, 
stupid”). And it was the economy that could be a foreign policy tool in his hands, 
because free trade and economic development should lead to social and political 
changes.33 The “China problem,” and particularly the human rights problem in China, 
was very vivid in American society, hence it was one of the very few foreign policy 
issues Clinton decided to deal with in his presidential campaign. The acting president 
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was strongly criticized for “coddling the dictatorship” (as the unconditional renewing 
of the MFN clause was called).34  
Clinton entered the White House as a politician who would firmly place the 
problems of human rights or WMD proliferation on his agenda. Nomination of 
Winston Lord, a well-known critic of the Beijing regime, to Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs seemed to indicate a tightening of the China 
policy. But even before his inauguration, Clinton met with Bush and said: “We have a 
big stake in not isolating China, in seeing that China continues to develop a market 
economy.”35 This tendency was strengthened by the members of the newly created, 
National Economic Council headed by R. Rubin and lobbying groups. Despite his 
assurances, in June Clinton decided to renew the MFN clause to China, although he 
intended to make its renewing in 1994 dependent on “China’s overall significant 
progress” in human rights matters. As one of the commentators said, this solution had 
been agreed on by almost everybody, i.e. the Congress and the administration, but the 
only problem was the lack of the agreement by the most important partner – China.36 
The decision to link the MFN renewal with “significant progress” is regarded as a 
serious mistake of the U.S. administration. From an objective point of view, everyone 
wanted the clause to be renewed, but they couldn’t renew it without at least symbolic 
concessions. Clinton was pressed by both business lobbies and consumer 
organizations, so he couldn’t oppose the MFN renewal and announced the “delinkage” 
in May 1994.37 On the other hand, we must point out that the PRC leadership couldn’t 
do more, because it was very weak. Moreover, the conservative and anti-reformist 
wing in the party was prevailing, which posed a serious threat to Chinese reforms and 
U.S.–China relations.38  
Beginning in 1993, the “comprehensive (constructive) engagement” strategy was 
applied. It worked on the assumption that developing social and economic contacts 
with China was reasonable and would lead to consolidation of the liberalizing 
tendencies in this country, even though its achievements in the field of human rights 
were not satisfying. This gradual easing of tensions in bilateral relations was also an 
element of, developed further in 1996, the strategy of “engagement and enlargement.” 
One of its main purposes was to maintain constructive relations with great powers, 
both allies and former foes, such as China and Russia, for the sake of their importance 
for U.S. security and prosperity.39  
The first official meeting of Chinese and American presidents took place in 
November 1993 during the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in 
Seattle. Although both sides had made some conciliatory gestures before the meeting, 
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its atmosphere wasn’t very enthusiastic. Both Clinton and Jiang read earlier prepared 
speeches without any personal commentary.40 
Despite the “comprehensive engagement” strategy and the steady progress in 
bilateral relations, the next two years were very difficult for both countries, mainly 
because of the “Taiwan problem.” When the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui asked 
for a visa to attend the alumni meeting at his Alma Mater – Cornell University – 
Congress passed a resolution calling on the president to grant it. Bill Clinton 
capitulated and decided to allow Lee to attend the meeting, despite the assurance, given 
personally by W. Christopher, that Lee wouldn’t receive the visa.41 
There were additional sources of increasing tensions. First, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (SFRC) passed a resolution in which Tibet was recognized as an 
occupied sovereign country and decided to appoint an official representative to this 
country. A dangerous indication of such a change was given in W. Lord’s speech 
before the SFRC (in October 1994), in which he encouraged the strengthening of social 
and economic ties, but also the promotion of Taiwan’s membership in international 
organizations, wherein the statehood wasn’t necessary.42 The last and the strongest 
episode of the confrontation over the Taiwan Strait was the Chinese maneuvers on the 
eve of the first democratic presidential election in Taiwan. The U.S. reacted very 
firmly, sending a strong fleet (including two aircraft carrier groups) to the region.43 
The aforementioned events stirred up a strong increase in the anti-American and 
nationalist movement in China. Its expression was a book published by a group of 
journalists in 1996 titled China Can Say No (Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu), wherein the 
authors reminded readers of one hundred years of humiliation and concluded that 
China deserved to regain its former glory, which would definitely happen in the 21st 
century. The book was very xenophobic, and was merely the first in a series of such 
works, many of which praised “Great Mao” and his policy.44 Similar currents were 
visible in the U.S. American authors pointed out the Chinese threat to the world peace 
and to the U.S.A. particularly, because the U.S. was the main obstacle in the regional 
and global aspirations of China.45 
                                                        
40 See P. Tyler, op.cit., p. 400. 
41 There were three reasons Bill Clinton made the visa decision. First, he saw no way to explain 
denying the president of a democratizing, friendly country permission to attend a private meeting at his 
alma mater. Second, the president was approaching his annual MFN fight and didn’t need additional trouble 
in Congress over China. Finally, the margins of vote on the House Concurrent Resolution were so large that 
if he resisted, Congress might pass legislation that would be even more damaging to the Sino-American 
relationship. See D. Lampton, op.cit., p. 50. 
42 See W. Lord, Taiwan Policy Review: Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington, September 27, at http://usinfo.org/sino/review_e.htm 
43 See R. Ross, The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of 
Force, “International Security,” vol. 25, no. 2, Fall 2000; M. O’Hanlon, Why China Cannot Conquer 
Taiwan, “International Security,” vol. 25, no. 2, Fall 2000. 
44 See Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Ramifications [in:] Ch. Marsh, J. 
Dreyer (eds.), U.S.–China Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Policies, Prospects and Possibilities, 
Lexington Books, Lanham 2003, pp. 67–68. 
45 Here one should mention R. Bernstein, R. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, A.A. Knopf, 
New York 1997; E. Timperlake, W. Tripplet, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to 
America, Regnery Pub, Washington 1999; B. Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets 
America, Regnery, Washington 2000. 
Despite the problems depicted above, the opinions, that “there is no real alternative 
to engaging China” started to prevail already in 1997.46 At the 1997 APEC summit in 
the Philippines, Clinton and Jiang agreed to Jiang’s visit to Washington and a summit 
meeting in Shanghai in 1998. During Jiang’s visit, both presidents focused on the role 
of bilateral cooperation in the world (the problems of security, ecology, etc.).47 More 
detailed arrangements were made in 1998 throughout Clinton’s visit to Shanghai. The 
wide range of issues encompassed: reprogramming nuclear weapons not to target each 
other; beginning negotiations about Chinese joining the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR); agreements dealing with an export of chemical and biological 
weapons and anti-personnel landmines; creation of a direct presidential link to 
communicate more effectively; and consultation concerning regional stability, 
especially on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East.48 Furthermore, what was 
very important to China was that president Clinton announced his so-called “three nos 
policy” doctrine, in which he stated that the U.S. would not support: the independence 
of Taiwan; the two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan) policy; or the membership of 
Taiwan in international organizations comprised solely of sovereign states.49  
This visit may be regarded as the crowning of the evolution of Clinton’s policy 
towards China. Moreover, he strongly engaged in promotion of PRC membership in 
the World Trade Organization, hoping that it would hasten democratization and 
liberalization in the country.50 One should also emphasize that both the president and 
the secretary of state Madeline Albright described the relationship with China as 
“strategic cooperation” or “a strategic partnership.”51 
This “strategic partnership” was put to the test in 1999 again. In April, Chinese 
prime minister Zhu Rongji came to the U.S. to finalize the bilateral negotiations 
concerning the PRC’s membership in the World Trade Organization. He agreed to 
make almost all the concessions the U.S. wanted, and in spite of the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo (which began on March 24th) he decided to pay a visit to the 
U.S. Unfortunately, he had to leave empty-handed, because the president and his 
advisors were afraid that the negotiated agreement would be rejected by the 
Congress.52 
The situation was complicated by the May bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade. It resulted in anti-American riots in China. The riots, however, were soon 
stopped, because they could be a threat to authority, and the Chinese had received an 
                                                        
46 See D. Shambaugh, The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation, “Current History,” 
September 1997. 
47 See Remarks by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin at Arrival Ceremony, The White 
House 1997, at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/jiangarv.htm 
48 See Fact Sheet, Achievements of U.S.–China Summit, The White House 1998, at 
http://clinton5.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/China/19980627-7898.html 
49 See H. Harding, American China Policy under the Bush Administration: Change and Continuity [in:] 
A. Rosenbaum (ed.), U.S.–China Relations and the Bush Administration: a New Paradigm or Continuing 
Modalities, Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont 2003, pp. 68–69. 
50 See Remarks by the President in Foreign Policy Speech, The White House 1999, at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/clint407.htm 
51 See T. Carpenter, Roiling Asia; U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbours, “Foreign Affairs,” 
November/December 1998. 
52 See J. Fewsmith, The Politics of China’s Accession to the WTO, “Current History,” September 2000. 
official apology and compensation for the bombing.53 The next problem was an 
interview given by Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwanese president, on the Deutsche Welle (a 
German international radio), in which he described the relations between China and 
Taiwan as special state-to-state relations, which was a slap on the cheek for Chinese 
politicians.54 His statement was moderated afterwards under pressure from the U.S.  
The situation improved in November, when the agreement concerning Chinese 
entry to the WTO was signed (it was discussed during the APEC summit in New 
Zealand). On October 10th, 2000 Bill Clinton established the Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations with China, ehich was the condition of Chinese membership in the World 
Trade Organization. 
The Main Challenges to G.W. Bush Administration 
The presidential election in 2000 seemed to be a kind of turning point in bilateral 
relations. “The strategic partnership” with China, as it was called by President Clinton 
and his administration, was replaced with the term “strategic competition” by of G.W. 
Bush’s team. Researchers have pointed out that this declared policy was only an 
attempt to show the differences between the current and former administration.55 
What problems did the new administration have to face, and how was it able to 
handle them?56 The first and most important problem was connected with the Taiwan 
Strait. President Bush promised to sell advanced weaponry to the island. This would 
probably only exacerbate the tensions on the strait.57  
The next important difficulty was the project of the National Missile Defense 
(NMD), officially targeted at the “rogue states,” but very dangerous for the People’s 
Republic of China, which had only about 20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs). The Chinese nuclear potential would become useless in the aftermath of the 
creation of this system. But the most disturbing thing for China was the project of the 
Theater Missile Defense that would protect the U.S. allies in Asia, and could include 
Taiwan.58 The next disputed point was the net of U.S. alliances in the region, which 
was a potential field of Chinese expansion. But on the other hand, the American 
presence there was a crucial element of the security architecture in the region and the 
lack of stability there could be dangerous for China and its economic development as 
well.59 The new administration’s China policy was, however, compromise-minded, and 
the relations shaped up well.  
An important change in the strategic situation of the PRC was the aftermath of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the 
“war on terrorism” that stemmed from them. As Strobe Talbott has written, the U.S. 
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administration, which had been looking for a new enemy to replace the Soviet Union, 
didn’t have to look any further. It found it, and it was global terrorism.60 
A couple of days after the terrorist attack, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin called 
President Bush and promised wide support and cooperation in fighting against world 
terrorism. The Chinese help perhaps wasn’t very important from a military point of 
view, but China was a permanent member of the UN Security Council, hence it could 
facilitate the American action. On the other hand, through its participation in the anti-
terrorist coalition China wanted to justify its campaign against Muslim Uyghurs 
inhabiting the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.61 
Summarizing, one must point out that the U.S. anti-terrorist campaign made good 
relations with other countries, especially China, more important, and concurrently 
reduced pressure on such “inconvenient” matters as human rights abuses, and this led 
to the best Sino-American relations ever. 
Conclusions – Prospects of the Relations 
In the 12 years we’ve examined in this article, we can see that bilateral relations 
improved significantly. They evolved from the crisis in 1989 to become more stable 
and peaceful, which is particularly visible when we compare the reactions to the 1996 
Taiwan Strait crisis to the much more balanced response to the EP-3 collision in 2001.  
There are a couple of reasons that have brought about this gradual improvement. 
First and foremost is the economic reason – bilateral trade and investments are 
important for both sides (statistically they are more important for China, but in the U.S. 
industrial lobbies as well as consumers are stronger). We cannot neglect the role of 
social contacts, of course. The political relations tend to be good as well, because each 
side aims at the assurance of peace and stability in the region, which is essential for 
their harmonious development. 
We can’t forget, however, that there are a lot of contradictions in the relations. The 
most important one is the Taiwan question. On the one hand, the U.S. accepts and 
supports “the one China policy,” while on the other it’s Taiwan’s ally (in the aftermath 
of the Taiwan Relations Act). The Taiwan question is regarded as one of the most 
dangerous in contemporary international relations. The next problem is connected with 
WMD proliferation, although significant progress has been made in this area, mainly 
because the proliferation is detrimental to China as well. Difficulties in bilateral 
relations are caused also by human rights abuses in the PRC, but the market reforms 
and gradual opening of this country has resulted in ongoing improvement in this field. 
The subject of the National Missile Defense has become particularly sensitive recently. 
Its creation would make the Chinese nuclear potential practically useless, depriving 
China of one of its “superpower” attributes.  
And here is the heart of the matter and the basic contradiction between these two 
countries. Both of them aim at gaining the dominant place in the world, or – to be exact 
– the U.S. wants to preserve its superiority and China pretends to gain it. The PRC is 
currently too weak (if we look at the economy and military potential) to challenge the 
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U.S. Analyses reveal, however, that the Chinese economy will outrun the American, 
which is a simple premise to elude the American military potential as well. 
Will the U.S. allow it, and will there be a confrontation between the two powers? 
Presently the Asia-Pacific region is the field in which their interests and superpower 
ambitions intersect. The U.S. turns towards this region more and more, while China 
regards it as its regional power influence zone. There have been no incidents heralding 
an imminent conflict, however. 
It’s not happening because both countries care about maintaining a stable and 
peaceful world system, which both of them guaranteed a place at the top, which is 
stressed by the theoreticians of interdependence. The potential confrontation could cost 
the U.S. the loss of its dominant position in the world system. China risks the 
breakdown of its economy, which could lead to large-scale social unrest and result in 
the fall of the CCP. This is why both countries will probably compete solely in the 
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